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1 Introduction
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC), studies the problem where several
players want to jointly compute a given function without disclosing their inputs;
this problem was first addressed by Yao [1]. Different adversary models can be
considered. A semi-honest setting, where corrupted players try to learn only
what can be inferred from the information they have been provided with; or
an active setting, where they manipulate the data in order to learn from any
possible leakage caused. Several cryptographic primitives for secret sharing and
homomorphic encryption, e.g. Shamir scheme [2] and Pailler encryption [3],
have been proposed to address the problem.
Applications have emerged naturally in different fields, for instance, where
all the secret information is sent by the players to a third trusted party who
only reveals the final output. For example, in auctions, the auctioneer can be
seen as a trusted third party. We study the scenario where no trusted third
parties are allowed.
Since 1982, MPC has been in constant development [4, 5, 6, 7]. At first MPC
was regarded as a theoretical research project. Later, the advent of frameworks
like Fairplay [7], SEPIA [8] or the open source tool Virtual Ideal Functional-
ity Framework (VIFF) [9], complemented by an improvement in performance
bounds, fostered the appearance of real life applications e.g. Damg˚ard et al. [10].
Faster MPC protocols immediately followed [11], widening the spectrum for ap-
plication development.
Classical network flow problems arise in real life applications in several ar-
eas e.g. project planning, networking, supply chain management, production
scheduling. Combinatorial optimization, dynamic programing and mathemat-
ical programming have yielded polynomial-time algorithms for many of these
problems (a detailed treatment can be found in Ahuja et al. [12]).
Our central objects of study are the shortest path problem on weighted
graphs, the Minimum Mean Cycle problem (MMC) and the the minimum cost
flow problem (MCF). We present algorithms that address privacy preserving
constraints on these problems and solve them in polynomial time. We also em-
pirically test the performance of our implementations. Finally, we show how
to use our protocols as building blocks to solve more complex problems. For
example, a WLAN network constructed by competing agents that want to se-
curely compute, in a distributed fashion, their routing tables and the network
flow configuration that supports its maximum traffic volume at the minimum
cost possible. The routing algorithms could use our shortest path protocol to
securely define the routing tables. Moreover, a combination of the max flow
algorithm [13] with our minimum cost flow protocol could be used to obtain the
desired flow distribution securely. Note that for these types of application the
number of vertices e.g. routers, is not necessarily very large.
1.1 Our Contributions
We provide algorithmic solutions to three classical network flow problems in a
multi-party and distributed setting: the shortest path based on Dijkstra, the
minimum mean cycle using Karp’s solution and the Minimum Cost Flow using
the Minimum Mean Cycle Canceling (MMCC) algorithm. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time the last two problems have been studied under
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Advance Impl.l Simple Impl. Complete Graphs Privacy Preserving Secure Comparisons
Dijkstra |E| + |V | · log(|V |) |V |2 |V |2 |V |3 |V |2
MMC |E| · |V | |E| · |V | |V |3 |V |5 |V |3
MMCC |V |2 · |E|3log(|V |) |V |2 · |E|3log(|V |) |V |8 · log(|V |) |V |10 · log(|V |) |V |8 · log(|V |)
Table 1: Asymptotic bounds of Original and Privacy-Preserving algorithmic
versions
MPC security constraints. We also introduce a novel technique to hide the
vertex selected at each iteration of Dijkstra’s algorithm, avoiding the overhead
caused by the use of special data structures e.g. oblivious data structures. This
is particularly relevant on dense graphs. We refer the reader to Section 1.2 for
further analysis. However, it has to be noticed that it is not the case for other
graph instances. Moreover, we show polynomial bounds for all three problems
relying only on black box operations, discussed in detail in the following sections.
The secret information can be distributed as pleased by the parties. Our work
considers input data to be secret except for a bound in the number of vertices
of the graphs, hiding the weights and costs of the edges as well as the topology
of the graph.
First, we identify the best and more efficient algorithms that are suitable to work
with the limited FABB functionality. Then, we introduce secure versions of these
algorithms, guaranteeing their correctness and provide their complexity bounds.
We also report on computational experiments on running implementations of
these algorithms using Python and VIFF (given its status as an open source
tool, capabilities, performance and availability).
Protocol Design. Performance is highly tied to the capabilities of the FABB .
How crypto-primitives are implemented and their scalability i.e. number of
players, determine the general overhead of the protocols. Factors like the round
complexity of the arithmetic methods, performance of the comparison method
used, number of players, and parallelization capabilities, influence the overall
process. Just as we do, traditional works abstract these details and focus solely
in the algorithm design.
Security and Correctness. The security of our algorithms comes from the fact
that we only use operations from the arithmetic black-box and prevent any in-
formation leakage. This implies that the protocols are as secure as the MPC
primitives they are implemented over e.g. information-theoretic secure (see also
Section 2.1). Furthermore the correctness of our algorithms is essentially in-
herited from the correctness of the classical algorithms from which they are
derived. More specifically, we modify the previously known and correct algo-
rithms to avoid, in general, information leakage, while working on secret data,
showing that these modifications do not alter their output.
Complexity. We use atomic communication rounds as our main performance
unit to determine the complexity (round complexity) of our protocols. Besides,
because of strong differences in performance between comparisons and multi-
plications motivate trade-offs, limiting the use of comparisons in favor of more
arithmetic operations. i.e. additions and multiplications.
Table 1 presents the complexity bounds we obtain. In all cases, the number
of comparisons matches the complexity of a best implementations on complete
graphs. However, we need to introduce additional multiplications to hide the
branchings involved in the algorithms.
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Prototyping. VIFF, provided the functionality needed to evaluate our proto-
cols and measure their performance. Details on the framework can be found in
[14]. VIFF delivers by default security against honest-but-curious adversaries,
and can be configured to provide certain protections against active attacks e.g.
[15]. Our tests show the effects, in terms of performance, that the implementa-
tions of the crypto-primitives have in our protocols. Single rounded primitives,
like multiplications can be consider to have a low performance cost (whatever
it takes to send on a piece of secret shared or encrypted information towards
other players on single round). Depending on the bit-size of the data processed,
a more complicated operations such as Toft’s comparison method used by VIFF
[16], is ≈ 150 times less efficient than a multiplication. Current state of the
art comparisons protocols [17] are still significantly more costly than multipli-
cations.
1.2 Related Works
Extensive effort has been made on comparisons and equality tests under MPC
e.g. [16, 18, 19, 20]. The most efficient, to the best of our knowledge, are
the comparison methods proposed by Limpa and Toft [17], with a sub-linear
complexity bound on the online phase. Nonetheless, work has also been done
for other kind of applications using various MPC techniques.
Sorting. Various sorting algorithms have been implemented using MPC. Goodrich
[21] securely implements shell-sort. Jo´nsson et al. [22] show how to securely im-
plement sorting networks. More recent work by Hamada et al. [23] and [24]
on combinatorial sorting algorithms has been also proposed, as well as a data-
oblivious version of a variant of the shell-sort called ”zig-zag” sorting [25] by
Goodrich.
Branching Programs. Branching mechanisms study the case where the decision
flows are determined by certain parametrization and the nature and value of
the input. Several authors have considered a two-party setting where the user
does not want to reveal its input and the server wants to privately compute
the branching e.g. [26, 27, 28]. While security is maintained, leakage of infor-
mation e.g. branching length, compromises the security of the algorithms for
applications like ours.
Graph Theory Problems. Different alternatives to solve some graph theory prob-
lems have been studied by Aly et al. [13], namely the shortest path and max-
imum flow problems. They provide bounds on the Bellman-Ford and Dijkstra
algorithms. Our own bounds are slightly better with our version of Dijkstra,
using different approaches. Indeed, [13] uses a searching array technique, sim-
ilar to the one proposed by Launchbury et al. [29], to keep track of a secret
shared index. Our proposed Dijkstra implementation does not require the use
of this technique, eliminating its overhead. Edmonds-Karp and push-relabel
bounds are provided as well for the maximum flow problem. As in our case,
their implementations are secure in the information-theoretic model relying on
the same arithmetic black-box FABB . Brickell and Shmatikov have addressed
the shortest path problem on a two-party case, limited to the honest by curious
model. They succeed by revealing at each iteration the new edge of the shortest
path added. Our approach attacks the problem in a different fashion by elimi-
nating this requirement. Moreover, our algorithms assume the capabilities the
arithmetic black-box used, and are therefore not limited to the two-party case.
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Finally, Banton et al. [30] have proposed data-oblivious alternative for the
Breath-First-Search (BFS) algorithm, which is later used to solve the special
case of the shortest path problem where all edges have the same weight e.g.
all existing edges weight 1 and non-existing 0. We consider instead the more
general case with weighted graphs. Additionally, they use their BFS algorithm
to provide bounds for the Max-Flow problem, where weighted edges with a pos-
itive residual capacity are mapped as 1 and its counterparts as 0, extending the
definition of an existing edge.
Linear Programming. Solutions for linear programming have been proposed by
several authors [31, 32, 33]. All three solve the problem by using the simplex
algorithm. Toft in [32] revises security weaknesses on Li and Atallah [31] propo-
sitions and presents termination conditions and methods for the algorithm, given
that simplex has no polynomial-time complexity.
Oblivious data structures over ORAM. Data structures are used to speed-up Di-
jkstra’s algorithm and achieve its optimal complexity. ORAM has been viewed
as a suitable mechanism to build oblivious distributed data structures with the
corresponding overhead and configuration e.g. The work of Wang et al. [34] de-
signed to work on a client(s)-server configuration. Moreover, secure two-party
computation protocols have been developed to take advantage of the recent
advances on ORAM e.g. [35, 36]. The two-party tool and algorithmic im-
plementations of Liu et al. [37] securely address the shortest path and other
combinatorial problems by using these kinds of data structures. More recently,
Keller and Scholl [38] show how to use oblivious data structures on a multi-party
setting, where none of the players have to fulfill the role of the server. Further-
more, they use their data structures to implement Dijkstra’s algorithm. Their
experimentation shows how some MPC solutions in the absence of ORAM can
perform better for certain kinds of graphs than their proposed counterparts i.e
samples of smaller-to-medium sizes and complete graphs of any size. This is eas-
ily explained by the fact that the overhead coming from the ORAM exceeds the
asymptotic advantage of the algorithms. Indeed, we address the problem differ-
ently, our Dijkstra algorithm is designed to work on plain vectors and matrices
and does not require any secure data structure construction, slightly improving
the bounds proposed by Aly et al. [13], who’s work is later used in Keller and
Scholl’s analysis. This allows us to avoid any overhead caused by the use of
ORAM or static secret sharing arrays. We refer to [38] for details.
1.3 Overview
Section 2 describes the notation we use, as well as the cryptographic primitives.
It also serves to introduce ”building blocks” i.e. small algorithmic procedures
regularly used. In Section 3 we present a solution for Dijkstra. Section 4 in-
troduces the minimum mean cycle problem. Section 5 then explains the imple-
mentation using MPC primitives. Section 6 gives an overview of the minimum
flow problem and the minimum mean cycle-canceling algorithm. In the sections
ahead, details on the algorithm are presented. Following this, Section 7 specifies
the secure formulation of the problem and gives some general remarks, it also
provides the body implementation of the algorithm with MPC primitives and
contemplate early termination conditions. Section 8 shows the results of our
computational experimentation. Lastly, Section 9 provides general conclusions.
5
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Security
We use the terms ”securely” and ”privacy preserving” indistinctly. We can
succinctly formalize their notion as follows: parties P1, ..., Pn want to jointly
and correctly compute the function y = f(x1, ..., xn) where xi is Pi secret input.
The security constraints are as follows: only y is allowed to be revealed to all
parties. In other words, the security constraint is such that each player Pi learns
y and what can be inferred from y, but no more. In particular, any information
given during the computation process should not allow him to infer information
about other secret inputs.
Additionally, all our protocols are designed under the information-theoretic
model in the presence of passive or active adversaries over FABB . This implies
that as long as the parties do not have access to other private data but their own,
unbounded computing power would not allow them to obtain any additional
information. This means in practice that they will be as secure as the underlying
MPC functionality and crypto-primitives they rely on.
2.2 Cryptographic Assumptions
Modulo arithmetic for some M or ring arithmetic allows to simulate secure
integer arithmetic. Indeed, several multi-party computation solutions have been
designed to work on modulo arithmetic for an appropriate M e.g. a sufficiently
big prime number (transforming the ring in a finite field over some M, ZM ),
such that no overflow occurs. This is true for secret sharing schemes the likes
of Shamir [2] sharing or additive sharing, as well for homomorphic threshold
public key encryption.
Primitives like addition between secret shared inputs on secret sharing, as
well as additions and multiplications of these by public values, are linear oper-
ations and do not require any information transmission between players. When
data is communicated between players it is called a communication round or just
round. For complexity analysis purposes, we require constant-round protocols
for multiplications. By extension, sharing and reconstruction are done in one
round as well. There are still local operations involved with all the primitives,
but the performance cost is mainly determined by the communication processes,
as explained by Maurer [39]. We assume that the execution flavor i.e. sequential
and parallel, does not compromise the security of the private data.
2.3 The Arithmetic Black-Box
Multi-party computation, by privately sharing inputs, can be performed in dif-
ferent ways, (using homomorphic encryption techniques e.g. [3, 40, 41], or
secret sharing formulations, like the one introduced by Shamir [2]). The con-
cept of the arithmetic black-box FABB [42] embeds this behavior and makes
the process transparent for the algorithm designer. It creates an abstraction
layer between the protocol construction and functionality specificities, and at
the same time it provides the security guarantees desired. Following [42, 19, 13],
we assume the following functionalities are available: storage and retrieval of
ring ZM elements, additions, multiplications, equality and inequality tests.
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Several MPC schemes for all of these operations have been proposed in the
last 30 years. Multiplications have been addressed by [5, 43, 44] amongst others.
As mentioned, comparisons with statistical security and sub-linear complexity
on the on-line phase have been explored in [19, 17], and perfect security in
constant rounds by [45, 18, 20, 17].
2.4 Notation
We use the traditional square brackets e.g. [x], to denote secret shared or
encrypted values contained in the FABB . This notation is commonly used by
secure applications [45, 20, 13]. Sometimes [∞] is used on our algorithms. Given
that the FABB is limited by the size of M , this value, has to be understood as
a sufficiently large constant smaller than M but much bigger than the values of
the inputs, and depending on the application on which it is going to be used. It
has to be noted that some comparison protocols require a security parameter on
the size of M that has to be taken into account when defining its size. Moreover,
secure operations are described using the infix operation e.g. [z]← [x] + [y] for
secure addition into the FABB and [z]← [x] · [y] for secure multiplication. The
secret result of any secure operation primitive is stored in [z] and onto the FABB .
This notation covers all operations performed with secret values, including those
performed with public scalars and secret values.
We define two repeatedly used subroutines to improve readability and sim-
plify expressions. They only use the primitives available in the FABB and work
under the same general assumptions.
conditional assignment : Overloaded functionality of the assignment op-
erator represented by [z]←[c] [x] : [y]. Much like in [37, 32, 13], the behavior
of the assignment is tied to a secretly shared binary condition [c]. If [c] is
one, [x] is assigned to [z] and [y] otherwise. Our version employs a single
multiplication for that purpose. Protocol 1 shows the implementation of
the conditional assignment, using only supported FABB operations. The
subroutine can be extended for other mathematical structures i.e. vectors,
matrices.
Protocol 1: Implementation of secure conditional assignment.
Input: Binary expression [c], assignment values [x] and [y].
Output: Value [z] containing [x] if 1 and [y] if 0, evaluated according the
binary expression [c]
1 [a]← [c] · ([x]− [y]);
2 [z]← [y] + [a];
conditional exchange : We define the operator condexch([c], i, j, [v]). It
exchanges the values held in position i and j of secretly shared vector [v] if
a secretly shared binary condition [c] is 1 and leaves the vector unchanged
otherwise. We describe the algorithm as protocol 2. We also extend this
operator to work with matrices. In that case both ith and jth rows and
columns are swapped.
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Protocol 2: condexch: Exchanges the values of 2 different vector positions
Input: Any vector [v]. Indexes i, j
Output: The vector [v] with values i,j swapped if [c] true.
1 [a]← [c] · ([v]j − [v]i);
2 [v]i ← [v]i + a;
3 [v]j ← [v]j − a;
2.5 On Network Flows and Matrix Representation
The number of vertices in the graph or at least an upper bound on them are
assumed to be publicly known with no restrictions on how the information is
distributed amongst the players. Following [13, 30, 38] our protocols assume
complete graph representation for their inputs, as a tool to hide the graph
structure. That is why an adjacency matrix representation of the graph, using
the bound as its size, is preferred. Capacities and/or costs of the edges are
represented as elements in matrices. This allows the algorithm designer to
decouple the graph representation from its topology. The application designer
has to define how information of the topology is actually distributed and what
is hidden. For instance, if its known that each player owns at most a single
vertex, then, each player has to secretly share a row of a capacity adjacency
matrix where he places a [0] at each unconnected vertex position or [∞] if its a
cost matrix.
We briefly describe some general definitions on graph theory that are of-
ten used during the following sections. Ahuja et al. [12] provides more formal
notions.
Strong Connectivity: Is a special case of a directed graph G = (V,E)
where, there is at least one path from every vertex to any other vertex.
Residual Capacity: Is the difference between the capacity of an edge (v, w) ∈
E and the flow circulating over it.
Residual Graph: Is the associated network defined by all edges with pos-
itive residual capacities.
Walk: Is a sequence of contiguous edges (v1, w1), ..., (vk, wk) such that wi =
vi+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and (vi, wi) ∈ E for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Path: A path is a walk of G where no vertex is visited more than once.
Every path, by definition is a walk, but not all paths are walks.
Cycle: A cycle is a special path (v1, w1)...(vd, wd) ∈ E where v1 = wd.
Every cycle by definition is a path, but not all paths are cycles.
3 Dijkstra’s Algorithm
The algorithm provides a greedy way to find the shortest path from a source
vertex s in a directed connected graph with non-negative capacities. Basically,
it selects the vertex with the smallest accumulated distance and then propagates
the path forward until all vertices have been explored. This ensures to get the
8
Protocol 3: Shortest Path Protocol based on Dijkstra’s algorithm
Input: A matrix of shared weights [U ]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |} and a unit
vector [S] encoding the source vertex.
Output: The vector of predecessors [P ] and/or the vector of distances
[d]i.
1 for i← 1 to |V | do
2 [pi]i ← i; [d]i ←[Si] [0] : [∞]; [P ]i ← i[S]i;
3 end
4 for i← 1 to |V | do
5 for j ← |V | to i+ 1 do
6 [c]← [d]j < [d]j−1;
7 ([pi], [P ], [d], [U ])← condexch([c], j, j − 1, [pi], [P ], [d], [U ]);
8 end
9 for j ← i+ 1 to |V | do
10 [a]← [d]i + [U ]i,j ;
11 [c]← [a] < [d]j ;
12 [d]j ←[c] [a] : [d]j ;
13 [P ]j ←[c] [pi]i : [P ]j ;
14 end
15 end
shortest path from a source vertex to all other vertices in the graph. To find
the shortest path to a single vertex is also possible. Our secure implementation
can be adapted to detect at each iteration whether the target vertex has been
reached to stop the algorithm.
Adapting Dijkstra to MPC. The input data in our case is a weighted adjacency
matrix [U ] where non existing edges are represented by [∞]. Dijkstra’s algorithm
treats the vertices of the graph in an order that depends on the capacities of the
edges. The main challenge is to hide this order. Earlier work [13] has proposed
to hide the position of the vertex accessed by using a secretly shared unary
vector [0, 0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0]. We introduce a different technique. The basic idea
is to exploit the symmetry in the data structure. More precisely, the numbering
of the vertices or equivalently, the position of a vertex in the data structure is
indifferent for the algorithm. We exploit this by positioning at iteration i, the
vertex with the lowest distance in position i. That way we align the vertex
exploration of our protocol with the secret data stored in all the structures.
This enables us to gain in the number of operations performed because we can
avoid considering edges pointing to vertices already explored. The algorithm is
detailed as Protocol 3.
Correctness Because the algorithm constantly reshuﬄes the positions of the
vertices in all matrices and vectors used, we need to (secretly) track the position
of the vertices. This is the role of the vector pi. Throughout the algorithm pij
holds the node number that is currently in position j.
The loop on lines 5-8 determines the untreated vertex with current minimum
distance. This vertex is brought to position i in all data structures. Loop
on lines 9-14 scans all edges leaving node in position i to all other untreated
vertices (positioned after i). If the edge improves the current best path (Line
11), the current best distances and predecessors are updated (Lines 12-13). The
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predecessor of node i is recorded as Pj . If the path needs to be kept secret and
subsequently used in a parent protocol, then it would be more suitable to record
this information in a matrix with Pi,j = 1 indicating that the predecessor of i
is j (and 0 otherwise). It is easy to adapt the algorithm for this case.
Security. Following the correctness analysis, the protocol does not need to leak
intermediate values on any inner process. Moreover, Operations are provided by
the FABB . Additionally, The number of operations depends solely on the upper
bound on the number of vertices (we assumed this to be public), therefore the
same follows for the execution CPU time and memory usage. These adheres to
our definition of security, no player learns anything but the output.
Complexity. The algorithm performs |V |2+O(|V |) comparisons (at Lines 6 and
11) and 4·|V |
3
3 + O(|V |2) multiplications, dominated by Line 7 (the 4/3 factor
is 4 times the sum of the square of the integers 1 to |V |). This distinction is
important for small graph instances where the comparison complexity dominates
over round complexity.
The performance of our privacy preserving version of Dijkstra has an extra
factor of |V | when compared with a vanilla implementation. Brickell [46] elimi-
nates this overhead by revealing at each iteration the current shortest path. Our
approach does not leak any information but the final shortest path. Moreover,
it can also be extended to obtain the shortest path between any pair of vertices
(v, w) ∈ V . It can also be seen that no special data-structure is needed, giving
the FABB autonomy on the crypto-primitive selection.
4 Minimum Mean Cycle Problem
The Minimum Mean Cycle problem (MMC) is to determine (on a directed graph
G = (V,E) with edge costs C) the cycle W with the minimum averaged cost
(total cost divided by the number of edges in W ). The original description of
the problem and algorithms can be found in [47, 48, 49, 50].
Our interest on the MMC problem comes from the fact that it is used as
a subroutine to solve the minimum cost flow problem by the minimum mean
cycle canceling algorithm [51]. It is also used by other algorithms of the same
nature. More details like applications, proofs and algorithms can be found in
[12]. The following analysis assumes strong connectivity on G. In case a graph
instance does not provide enough edges to fulfill this requirement, edges with a
very large cost can be added to the graph.
The solution proposed by Karp [50] can be divided in two steps. First, we
arbitrarily define a vertex s to be the origin of all paths to all vertices in V .
Let dk(i) be the smallest weighted walk from s to the vertex i that contains
exactly k edges. The walk obtained might contain one or several cycles. Then,
we calculate dk(v) ∀v ∈ V with k from 1 to |V |. The following shows how to
compute this recursively:
dk(j) = min
{i:(i,j)∈E}
{dk−1(i) + cij}, (1)
where d0(s) = 0 and d0(v) =∞ ∀v ∈ {V − s}. Second, we calculate the cost of
the minimum mean cycle as:
µ∗ = min
j∈V
max
0≤k≤|V |−1
[
d|V |(j)− dk(j)
|V | − k
]
(2)
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This expression can be intuitively explained as follows. Let j∗ and k∗ the indexes
achieving µ∗. Then d|V |(j∗) is the cost of a walk containing the cycle W and
dk
∗
(j∗) is the cost of the same walk with the cycle removed e.g. it is a path. The
difference between the two yields the cycle cost. Proofs can be found in [50]. A
strictly positive or negative µ∗ means that at least a positive/negative cycle is
present with µ∗ as its mean. A case where the answer is 0 might also mean no
cycle was found in the graph. The algorithm can be extended to find the cycle
W as part of the answer. Overall algorithmic complexity is O(|V ||E|).
5 Privacy-Preserving MinimumMean Cycle So-
lution
The privacy-preserving solution we introduce follows the steps provided by the
previous section. Moreover, each step and the whole protocol are designed to be
used as sub-routines. As usual, our approach assumes all input data is in secret
form, including the adjacency matrix of costs [C], where non-existing edges are
represented by [∞]- except the upper bound on the number of vertices. Ad-
ditionally, all quantities are integers bounded by some M i.e. bigger than the
greatest quantity to be analyzed, but still much smaller than the size of the field
ZM to avoid overflows, and the edge costs as an adjacency matrix. The final goal
of the protocol is to obtain not only the mean cost of the minimum cycle, but
the cycle itself as well. We use the function getmincycle to refer to the protocol.
Correctness. First, we have to replicate the result of equation (1). We select
node 1 as the source node s. Implementing the recursion is fairly straightforward
as the order in which the edges are scanned does not depend on the input.
The more difficult task is to encode the walks. To that end, we define the 4-
dimensional matrix [walk] where [walk]i,j,k,l is the number of times the edge
(i, j) is traversed by the shortest walk of length k from s to l. Also, because of
the specific way we want to use our secure version of the MCC algorithm as a
sub-routine, we define an additional argument [b] to the protocol. Specifically,
[b]i,j = 1 indicates that the edge (i, j) is forbidden, i.e. cannot be part of the
solution. The algorithm is detailed as Protocol 4.
Loop 5-8 checks whether edge (i, j) improves the walk of length k from s
to j. This is done by comparing the best one found so far with cost [A]jk to
[A]ik−1 plus the cost of edge (i, j). Depending on the result, the best costs and
walks are updated.
Second, we adapt (2) to obtain the value of the minimum mean cycle, as
well as the encoding of the cycle. We achieve it by iterating over the matrices
[A] and [walks] generated in the first step. The only difficulty is to workaround
the non-integer division. In place of any costly procedure, we keep track of
the numerators and the denominators separately, and compare only the cross
multiplication instead. The minimum mean cost cycle is encoded as a |V | ×
|V | matrix [min − cycle] where [min − cycle]ij = 1 if the edge (i, j) is part
of the minimum mean cycle. The rest of the algorithm is a straightforward
implementation of (2). The details are provided as Protocol 5.
Security. Like with our Dijkstra implementation, no intermediate data is re-
leased and the operations are provided by the FABB , following our definition of
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Protocol 4: First step of: MMC protocol based on Karp’s algorithm
Input: A matrix of shared costs [C]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}, a binary
matrix on viable edges [b]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}.
Output: A matrix of walk costs [A]i,k for i ∈ {1, ..., |V |} and
k ∈ {0, ..., |V |}, a walk matrix walksij for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}
encoding these walks.
1 [A]← [∞]; [A]00 ← [0]; [C]← [C] + [∞](1− [b]);
2 for k ← 1 to |V |+ 1 do
3 for j ← 1 to |V | do
4 for i← 1 to |V | do
5 [c]← [A]ik−1 + [C]ij < [A]jk;
6 [A]jk ←[c] [A]ik−1 + [C]ij : [A]jk;
7 [walks]··kj ←[c] [walks]··k−1i : [walks]··kj ;
8 [walks]ijkj ←[c] [walks]ijkj + 1 : [walks]ijkj ;
9 end
10 end
11 end
Protocol 5: Second step of: MMC protocol based on Karp’s algorithm
Input: A matrix of walk costs [A]i,k for i ∈ {1, ..., |V |} and
k ∈ {0, ..., |V |}, a walk matrix walksij for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}
encoding these walks.
Output: The cost of the minimum mean cycle [min− cost]. A matrix
with the minimum mean cycle [min-cycle]i,j for
i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}.
1 for j ← 1 to |V | do
2 [max-cycle], [max-cost]← ∅;
3 for k ← |V | to 1 do
4 [a-num]← [A]j(|V |+1) − [A]jk;
5 [a-den]← |V | − k;
6 [c]← [k-num] · [k-den] < [a-num] · [k-den];
7 [k-num]←[c] [a-num] : [k-num];
8 [k-den]←[c] [a-den] : [k-den];
9 [max-cycle]←[c] [walks]··|V |j − [walks]··kj : [max-cycle];
10 [max-cost]←[c] [A]jk : [max-cost]
11 end
12 [c]← [j-num] · [k-den] > [k-num] · [j-den];
13 [j-num]←[c] [k-num] : [j-num];
14 [j-den]←[c] [k-den] : [j-den];
15 [min-cycle]←[c] [max-cycle] : [min-cycle];
16 [min-cost]←[c] [max-cost] : [min-cost]
17 end
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security. Complexity. In total (Protocols 4 and 5), our implementation of MMC
requires O(|V |3) (Line 5 of Protocol 4) and O(|V |5) multiplications or communi-
cation rounds (from the conditional assignments of Lines 7 and 8 of Protocol 4).
One might ask whether this could not be brought down to O(|V |4) by encoding
the walks in Protocol 4 as a 3-dimensional matrix holding the predecessor node
of each node. However, reconstructing the walks for the operation performed at
Line 9 of Protocol 5 would then need O(|V |5) conditional assignments instead
of the currently O(|V |4). So we prefer to stick with our simple and as efficient
approach.
6 Minimum Cost Flow Problem
The Minimum-Cost Flow problem (MCF) is of finding a feasible flow in a capac-
itated directed graph G = (E, V ) that minimizes the costs (proportional to the
magnitude of the flows). The problem can be modeled as a linear program but
there exists more efficient strongly polynomial time combinatorial algorithms,
see [12, 52]. The more traditional minimum capacitated cost flow problem can
be shown to be equivalent to the transshipment and the minimum-cost circula-
tion (MCC) problem.
Formally, the MCC problem is of finding a capacitated flow in a symmetric
graph G = (E, V ) of minimum cost. The problem can be modeled as follows:
min
1
2
∑
v,w∈E
Cv,wfv,w (3)
subject to fv,w ≤ Uv,w ∀(v, w) ∈ E (4)
fv,w = −fw,v ∀(v, w) ∈ E (5)∑
v∈E(w)
fv,w = 0 ∀w ∈ V (6)
Here the graph is assumed to be symmetric, i.e. for every (v, w) ∈ E there
is an edge (w, v) ∈ E. Each edge (v, w) has a maximal capacity Uv,w and
a cost Cv,w per unit of flow. Additionally, all costs are antisymmetric, i.e.
c(v, w) = −c(w, v) ∀(v, w) ∈ E. The variable f represents the amount of flow
passing through an edge. Using this notation, the residual capacity can be
formally defined as rv,w = Uv,w − fv,w.
Constraints (4) are the capacity constraints. Constraints (5) are the flow
antisymmetry constraints. Constraints (6) are the flow conservation constraints
at each node. This characterization of the problem is the same used by Goldberg
and Tarjan [51] for their description of the MCC problem using the Minimum
Mean Cycle-Canceling algorithm (MMCC). It can be seen as a variant of the
non-polynomial cycle-canceling algorithm proposed by Klein in [53], but where
the next cycle to be canceled is chosen by finding the minimum mean cost cycle.
The change makes the algorithm strongly polynomial, i.e. its complexity only
depends on |V | and |E| and no other parameter.
The algorithm is based on the finding of Busacker and Saaty [54], which
asserts that a circulation with no residual negative cost cycles is of minimal
cost. Moreover, the algorithm can be characterized as follows:
1. Initialize the feasible circulation of as 0.
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2. Obtain the minimum mean cycle W in the associated residual graph.
3. Set δ ← min{(v, w) ∈Wrv,w}.
4. Augment the flow by δ along the cycle W .
5. If there are still negative cycles goto 2.
Basically, we compute the cycle with the minimum negative average cost W in
the associated residual graph. Then, we augment the flow along this cycle until
an edge reaches its capacity. This process is repeated until no negative cycle is
found. Its complexity is O(|V |2 · |E|3 · log |V |).
7 Privacy-Preserving Minimum-Cost Flow Prob-
lem
The input data are the capacity and cost adjacency matrices [U ] and [C], where
non-existing edges are represented by [0] on the capacity matrix and by [∞] on
the cost matrix. As usual, all input data is secretly shared, except the bound on
the number of vertices. We assume all values are integer and of a bounded size
much smaller than M to avoid overflows in the field ZM . The solution is to be
provided as the flow matrix [F ] and total cost [totcost]. The final composition
of [F ] might leak some details on the graph’s topology depending on the answer.
The protocol can be used as a sub-routine for more complex applications in case
the final output is kept private. Once the MMF problem is modeled as a MCC
problem, it is sufficient to securely solve the minimum circulation problem using
a privacy-preserving implementation of the MMCC algorithm to obtain a flow
of minimum cost.
Adapting the MMCC algorithm. If one wants to avoid any leakage of informa-
tion, an important difference between a standard implementation and a secure
one is that the augmenting flow process has to be repeated as many times
as the worst case analysis guarantees, instead of stopping it as soon as no
negative cycle is detected. We call each flow augmentation along the cycle
a phase/iteration. We use the bound provided by Goldberg and Tarjan on [51]:
|V ||E|2 log |V |+ |V | · |E| flow augmentations at most. Note that this is not an
asymptotic bound. Given that we also hide the graph structure, |E| has to be
replaced by |V |2 in our complexity estimates. Our secure protocol requires to
perform that many iterations to guarantee correctness with no leakage. Possible
stopping conditions to reduce the number of iterations are considered later in
this section.
Protocol 6 shows our privacy-preserving solution for the MMCC algorithm,
which is a straightforward translation of the algorithm outlined above.
Correctness. The initial solution is set to zero at Line 1. The body of the main
loop is one flow augmentation phase. It starts by calling our secure implemen-
tation of the Min Mean Cycle problem, leaving out saturated edges. Loop 5-9
computes the maximum augmentation possible along the cycle identified. If the
cycle has non-negative cost, this augmentation is set to zero at Line 10, before
updating the cost of the solution. Then the flow itself is augmented at Loop
12-17.
Security. Following the previous protocols, the current solution does not leak
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Protocol 6: Privacy-preserving MMCC
Input: |V | × |V | matrices of shared capacities [U ]i,j and shared costs
[C]i,j .
Output: The |V | × |V | matrix of flows [F ] and the associated total cost
[totcost].
1 [F ], [b], [totcost]← 0 ;
2 for k ← 1 to |V |5 log |V |+ |V |3 do
3 [cost], [cycle]← getmincycle([C], [b]);
4 δ ← [∞];
5 for (i, j) ∈ [U ] do
6 [r]← [U ]ij − [F ]ij ;
7 [c]← [min− cycle]ij · ([δ] > [r]);
8 [δ]←c [r] : [δ];
9 end
10 [δ]← [δ] · ([cost] < 0);
11 [totcost]← [totcost] + [δ] · [cost];
12 for (i, j) ∈ [F ] do
13 [c]← [cycle]ij ;
14 [F ]ij ←c [F ]ij + [δ] : [F ]ij ;
15 [F ]ji ←c [F ]ji − [δ] : [F ]ji;
16 [b]ij ← [U ]ij − [F ]ij > 0;
17 end
18 end
intermediate values and uses FABB operations to calculate secret data, respect-
ing our definition of security.
Complexity. The most costly operation during one augmentation phase is
the call to getmincycle with O(|V |3) comparisons and O(|V |5) communication
rounds. The overall complexity isO(|V |8 log |V |) comparisons andO(|V |10 log |V |)
communicational rounds. As mentioned above, one main difference between our
secure Minimum Cost Flow algorithm described above and a standard imple-
mentation is that, to guarantee no leakage of information, we have to execute
as many iterations as in the theoretical worst case. This makes the practical
performance of the algorithm much worse than a standard implementation be-
cause, in most practical applications, it is expected that the number of iterations
needed to find the optimal solution is much smaller than the theoretical upper
bound. Of course, one could easily publicly reveal the outcome of the test per-
formed at Line 10 of Protocol 6 and stop the algorithm if the cost of the cycle
is non-negative. But some information would be leaked.
To limit the amount of information leaked, several strategies are possible.
One is to open the test every K iterations, with K being a publicly known
integer. Another solution is to multiply the result of the test by a random bit
(for = 1 with probability p) to statistically hide the result. These two would
also be combined. In both cases, the parameters (K and/or p) would control
the trade-off between performance and information leaked.
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8 Computational Experiments
Although we can determine theoretical bounds for our protocols, processing time
is also constrained by a variety of phenomenons; the way on which the secure
arithmetic functionality is implemented and the infrastructure were prototypes
are executed affect their running time in real life applications. Therefore, we also
want to empirically test the performance of these algorithms. More specifically
we want to analyze the following aspects.
Measure the size of solvable instances using currently available MPC framework
e.g. (VIFF). The theoretical bounds only give a rate of increase with the size
of the instance. They do not say anything about the actual computing time.
Also, the scalability on VIFF is a concern. Our interest is to determine what is
the size of the instances that can be solved in a “reasonable” amount of time.
Moreover, we want to determine the impact that the number of players and the
size of the graph instances have on CPU time performance. As it was mentioned
VIFF was chosen, given its availability (open source) and easy coupling with
larger applications.
Comparison between complexity bounds and practical behavior. Implementing
the protocols described is a good way to check and demonstrate that no aspect
of the problem has been neglected in our analysis.
Overhead of secure vs. non-secure implementations. Real life applications, in
many cases, employ a trusted third party to share and compute their infor-
mation. It executes a non-secure implementation of an algorithm solving the
problem, and then reveals to the players the final output only. In this context,
we try to determine the real overhead in performance of an implementation with
secure and a non-secure implementation of the protocols studied.
To answer these questions, we have run the following implementations :
Standard non-secure version (SNSV). Solves the shortest path and minimum
capacitated cost flow problem with a vanilla (in this case, no optimized data
structure like a binary tree is used) implementation of the Dijkstra and MMCC
algorithms. Indeed, this algorithm could effectively be used by a third party
to compute the shortest path and MCF problems. We use it for benchmarking
against other implementations.
Secure version with VIFF (VVIFF). We use VIFF to implement our privacy-
preserving MMCC and Dijkstra algorithms and use it for benchmarking.
Secure version zero-cost Functionality (ZCOST). On this prototype, we assume
the performance cost added by the secure functionalities of our FABB to be 0.
We build our algorithms using nothing but Python. The goal is to differentiate
between the overhead introduced by the FABB itself, and the overhead intro-
duced by everything else in VIFF. Under this paradigm, we once again, measure
the performance of our Dijkstra and MMCC implementations. We use the data
for benchmarking against our algorithm’s realistic times obtained with VIFF,
and the standard prototype. Another strong motivation comes from how VIFF
manages its memory and its strong effect on performance. Indeed, it is clearly
visible when a relatively large amount of operations are performed. Moreover,
it can be seen on our experimentation. That way we can have a clean view of
the behavior of the prototypes.
VIFF benefits from passive security under the information theoretic model
on the multi-party case. VIFF provides access to Shamir secret sharing [2] and
BGW multiplications [55] optimized by Gennaro et al. [56]. For comparisons
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Number of vertices 4 8 12 16 20
Execution times (in seconds)
3 Players 0.9 5 14 28 48
4 Players 1 7 17 34 57
Table 2: CPU Time of protocol 3
we use the most recent Toft comparison method implemented [16]. VIFF was
selected because it is freely and openly accessible. Additionally, for our exper-
iments we use randomly generated complete graphs. All results presented are
averaged over 20 instances of the same size with 3 and 4 players.
All trials used the same workstation, an Intel Xeon CPUs X5550 (2.67GHz)
and 42GB of memory, running Mac OS X 10.7. Additionally, every single process
had the same amount of CPU power and memory available. Execution times
obtained from the non-secure implementations are in the order of microseconds.
This means that the times can be highly influenced by noise during the tests.
To normalize the noise, we execute the standard non-secure implementations
one hundred thousand times and then report the averages.
8.1 Shortest Path Problem
Table 2 shows the results obtained by our VVIFF shortest path prototype:
Additionally, we could run instances, using adjacency matrices, with a total
of 4032 edges/matrix entries, taking around 18 minutes. The spike in computing
time while working with these big instances follows the fact of the difficulty to
manage the memory for large graph instances.
Figure 1 also shows the CPU time and respective ratios calculated from our
different implementations:
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Figure 1: Dijkstra CPU Times and Ratio Analysis
From this we can conclude the following:
- We can solve securely, in reasonable time, shortest path problems on com-
plete graphs of sizes up to 64 vertices over VIFF.
- As expected, the number of players, have little incidence on the general be-
havior, given that in VIFF performance cost increases linearly in the number
of players [14].
- Compared to the standard implementation, roughly a factor of 5000|V | is
needed to securely solve the Dijkstra algorithm on VIFF.
- Roughly an extra factor of 1.4|V | is needed when executing crypto-primitives
have 0 cost, to solve the problem securely.
- Combining the two previous remarks, we conclude that out of the 5000|V |
overhead of our SMC implementation, the factor |V | is explained by algorith-
mic design, a factor 1.4 is due to non-crypto related VIFF implementation,
and the rest (a factor of a few thousands) is due to the crypto-related VIFF
implementation.
- Finally, for larger graphs, the ratio between execution time of VVIFF and
ZCOST decrease. This can easily be explained by the fact that it is the
number of multiplications that gains importance as opposed to the number
of comparisons, and that multiplications are substantially cheaper.
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A general conclusion is that security in our implementation comes at a very
high cost, but not so high as to make the approach completely out of question
in practice.
8.2 Minimum Flow Problem
For the minimum flow problem, we measure the time a single phase (one iter-
ation of Protocol 6) takes to be executed, given that stopping conditions with
some leakage can substantially reduce the number of phases needed e.g. A graph
with a single cycle would only take one phase to be completed. To estimate the
execution time of the full algorithm, it suffices to multiply this by the known
number of phases needed. Our analysis includes the ratio between the time it
takes the SNSV prototype to find an answer and the privacy preserving ver-
sions full execution time to guarantee correctness with no leakage. The results
of these experiments can be found in Table 3 and Figure 2.
Number of vertices 4 5 6 7 8 9
Execution times (in seconds)
MMCC Phase - 3 Players 11 21 35 56 84 125
MMCC Phase - 4 Players 13 24 42 65 100 147
Table 3: Execution times per phase MMCC Algorithm for a complete graph.
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Figure 2: Secure MMCC CPU Times and Ratio Analysis
From these we can conclude the following:
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- The fully secure version of our implementation is highly costly in terms of
performance even for very small instances. This highlights the necessity of
using termination conditions.
- Once again, the influence of the extra player has little incidence on the
overall performance time.
- The overhead of our secure implementation versus a standard one is of the
order of 2.5 · 108|V |2. Note that both algorithms have different complexity
functions and vanilla versions of the algorithm typically converge towards
an answer before reaching its worst case complexity.
- Again, one can observe that the multiplications absorb a larger fraction of
the computing time as the size of the instances increases.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Strongly polynomial-time algorithms are appealing for MPC implementations
because, as the worst-case complexity is polynomial, it is possible to obtain
fully secure (i.e. no leakage) and theoretically efficient algorithms and imple-
mentations. We have demonstrated this for three classical network problems:
Shortest Path, Minimum Mean Cycle and Minimum Cost Flow. However, our
computational experiments demonstrate that the price to pay for such security
is very high for the simplest problem (Shortest Path) and extremely penalizing
for the more complicated ones.
This research raises several questions for further work. A first one is whether
theoretically more efficient algorithms can be obtained for these problems. An-
other one is related to the development of more efficient MPC platforms com-
pared to the one we used for our computational experiments. Also one could
consider other classical optimization problems. Obvious candidates are the
Matching problem and Linear Programming. From a theoretical point of view,
Linear Programming is probably more interesting as no fully combinatorial the-
oretically efficient algorithm is known for this problem. The efficient algorithms
known (i.e. interior point methods and the volume algorithm) require linear
algebra and it is not clear that they can be fully adapted to the general MPC
constrains we report on.
More complex applications are also possible, using our implementation as
building block, for instance: Imagine you have calculated the maximum flow
of your network, and now want to obtain the configuration, equivalent to the
maximal flow, at the minimal cost possible. As we estated, this can be achieved
by using [13] to obtain the maximal flow, immediately followed by out MMCC
protocol described in 6.
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